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ABSTRACT 
 
Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty* 
 
We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a 
parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the 
agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and 
noise are normally distributed and when the effort and noise affect output additively. We then 
analytically solve for the optimal contract when the agent has exponential utility. We find that 
the Pareto frontier shifts out as information about the agent’s quality improves. In the 
standard spot-market setup, by contrast, when the parameter measures the agent’s “quality”, 
the Pareto frontier shifts inwards with better information. Commitment is therefore more 
valuable when quality is known more precisely. Incentives then are easier to provide because 
the agent has less room to manipulate the beliefs of the principal. Moreover, in contrast to 
results under one-period commitment, wage volatility declines as experience accumulates. 
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1 Introduction
Agency relationships often preclude complete monitoring so that a principal cannot
observe the agents actions. Other features of the environment, such as the managers
ability, the quality of his match with the rm, or the protability of the project under
management, can also be a source of uncertainty. Many relationships between rms
and workers, as well as between lenders and borrowers, are of this general form.
Yet, little is known about how parameter and e¤ort uncertainty interact to shape
the optimal design of incentive contracts. Does parameter uncertainty reinforce or
alleviate moral hazard concerns? Does it render commitment more or less valuable?
This paper provides some answers to these questions by focusing on cases where:
(i) the unknown parameter remains constant over time; and (ii) a risk neutral princi-
pal and a risk averse agent commit to a long-term contract. Under full-commitment,
incentives are designed to reward e¤ort and not ability. Disentangling the two is not
always feasible for the principal because they both inuence his only source of infor-
mation, i.e., realized revenues. Signal confusion enables the agent to manipulate the
principals beliefs. If the agent shirks (i.e., provides less e¤ort than recommended),
output will be below expectation and the principal will infer that the match produc-
tivity is lower than he had thought. The agent, on the other hand, knows that low
output was caused not by low productivity but by low e¤ort and so, after shirking,
is more optimistic about the value of the unknown parameter than the principal.
Compared to the situation in which all parameters are known, a given indexation
of future earnings to performance entails lower punishments for shirkers. By inducing
the principal to underestimate the match productivity, a shirker knows that he will
benet in the future from overestimated inferences about his e¤ort and thus higher
rewards. In order to prevent such belief manipulation, a long-term contract under
parameter uncertainty must entail a higher indexation to performance. This raises
income volatility, which lowers the welfare of the risk-averse agent. Moreover, if the
unknown parameter is constant, belief manipulation is more e¤ective early on in the
relationship because posteriors put higher weight on new information. This is why
the sensitivity of pay to performance declines over time.1
These implications stand in sharp contrast to the ones derived in the literature on
career concerns where the unknown parameter measures the agents general ability,
transferable from job to job. Analyzing this class of problems under spot markets
with up-front pay only, Holmström (1999) concludes that incentives are more easily
1Given a level of lifetime utility that the contract promises him, it is in the agents interest to
bias downward the principals belief about his ability. This was also a feature in the ratchet e¤ect
model of La¤ont and Tirole (1988). They consider an environment with adverse selection so that the
agent knows the actual productivity. By contrast, asymmetric beliefs do not exist from the outset
in our model but arise endogenously, and then only o¤ the equilibrium path.
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Figure 1: The effect of a rise in prior precision under spot markets
and under commitment.
provided when the agents reputation is not established. Agents will generally exert
ine¢ cient levels of e¤ort. At rst, e¤ort may exceed its rst-best level as the agent
seeks to build his reputation, but e¤ort diminishes over time, dwindling monotonically
to zero. Thus career concerns in competitive markets do not restore correct incentives
on the part of agents.2 Because of the convexity of the e¤ort-disutility term, as the
agents e¤ort declines, so do his rents. In other words, better information about the
agents quality reduces his equilibrium utility.
Figure 1 illustrates the e¤ect that higher precision of information about the agents
quality has on the welfare of the parties. Under spot contracts, competition for the
agents services ensures that the principal earns zero prots, and so we are on the
horizontal axis. Starting at a point on the horizontal axis where the agents value
is vA, a rise in information about the agents quality leaves the principals welfare
unchanged at zero, but reduces the agents welfare from vA to vB, as illustrated by
the arrow pointing to the left on the horizontal axis.
For reasons discussed above, the opposite happens under full commitment. The
spot contract is feasible but is generally suboptimal, and therefore the utilities that
it generates are strictly inside the Pareto frontier. When we raise precision about
the agents quality, there is less room for belief manipulation and the contract curve
2Holmström assumed that the agent was risk neutral. As shown in Section 6, introducing risk
aversion makes little di¤erence to the solution of the problem: E¤ort still converges monotonically
to zero. On the other hand, the contracting problem under risk neutrality becomes trivial: Even
one-period contracts with pay for performance can achieve rst best. More generally, a contract can
attain rst-best levels of e¤ort by transferring all uncertainty to the risk neutral agent and e¤ectively
selling the project to him.
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shifts out, as illustrated by the arrow pointing up and to the right. In contrast to spot
markets then, better information raises utility and pushes the Pareto frontier out.
Consequently, the value of commitment is higher when information about quality is
more precise.
Analyzing models with commitment and belief divergence entails the following
technical issue: Each deviation drives a permanent wedge between the agents and
the principals posteriors. As the duration of the relationship increases, the state space
is in general unbounded because the entire history of actions matters for evaluating
the agents options o¤ the equilibrium path. Models where the noise is Markovian
contain our assumptions about parameter uncertainty as a special case when the
persistence becomes innite and where the initial value is unknown with a common
prior attached to it. In that case the unknown parameter is the initial condition of
the process. Fernandes and Phelan (2000) or Williams (2008) study such Markovian
processes but they assume that the initial value is public knowledge. A recursive
approach to the problem would generally need to take beliefs of the agent and beliefs
of the principal as separate states. This, broadly speaking, is the approach Fernandes
and Phelan (2000) proposed. Unfortunately, it implies that the state space grows with
the number of potential deviations and is therefore ill-suited to solving our problem
where information persistence extends over several periods and actions are dened
over a continuum.
We rely instead on a rst-order approach, meaning that we focus on the equilib-
rium path and establish necessary condition for recommended e¤ort to be optimal.
The di¢ culty with this solution method is that it may identify contracts that are not
implementable because the concavity of the agents objective function is not guar-
anteed. Su¢ cient conditions have been established in the static case by Rogerson
(1985). Similar results in dynamic environments are not known. One remedy is to
numerically check the implementability of the solution, as in Abraham and Pavoni
(2008). To the best of our knowledge, the only proof in discrete time is by Kapicka
(2006) and is rather specic to the reporting problem analyzed in his paper. Hopen-
hayn and Jarque (2007) also analyze persistence in a principal-agent model under the
assumption that the e¤ort decision occurs solely in the rst period, whereas Jarque
(2008) assumes that the probability distribution over future output depends positively
on a weighted sum of past e¤orts.
To establish implementability, we cast our problem in continuous time. This allows
us to derive a parameter restriction under which recommended e¤ort meets both
necessary and su¢ cient conditions of the agent. The proof relies on the concavity
of the agents Hamiltonian, a strategy that was initially applied by Schättler and
Sung (1993) to continuous time contracts without persistent information. Williams
(2008, 2009) extends their methodology to incentives contracts with hidden savings or
reporting problems with persistent information. Our analysis shares many similarities
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with his approach. It di¤ers in that we have to model the learning process and thus
need to introduce contract duration as a state. Furthermore, we implement a di¤erent
proof strategy based on the work of Cvitani´c et al. (2009).
A burgeoning literature illustrates the advantages of using continuous time meth-
ods to analyze dynamic contracts, such as Sannikov (2008) though his model does
not feature learning. A series of recent papers on learning and dynamic incentives is
even more closely related to our work. Adrian and Westereld (2009) analyze a dy-
namic contracting model in which principal and agent disagree about the resolution
of uncertainty. They avoid complications linked to private information by assum-
ing that agents posteriors are common knowledge so that the two parties agree to
disagree. Giat et al. (2010) extend the model of Holmström and Milgrom (1987)
by also allowing initial beliefs to be asymmetric. They focus on contracts specifying
a single transfer at the end of the predetermined contracting horizon whereas our
setting allows transfers to be made throughout the relationship. Finally, DeMarzo
and Sannikov (2008) characterize continuous-time contracts when the agents quality
varies over time and is autocorrelated. On the one hand, our set-up is more specic
since we focus on cases where the unknown state remains constant through time and
the agent liability is not limited. On the other hand, we introduce risk aversion on the
agents side. Hence, whereas the main insights in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008) are
related to the optimal separation policy, our paper focuses on the incentive-insurance
trade-o¤.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the models set-up. In
section 3, we derive the agents necessary and su¢ cient conditions. Then we solve
for the optimal contract under exponential utility in Section 4. We propose a closed
form solution for the principals rent and optimal wage schedule. The properties of the
optimal contract are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 contrasts the full-commitment
with the spot wages solution of Holmström (1999) and the solution under partial
commitment of Gibbons and Murphy (1992). Section 7 sums up our ndings whereas
the proofs of the main Propositions and Corollaries are in Appendix A. We relegate
the proofs of some tangential claims to Appendix B, and describe in Appendix C our
simulation procedure.
2 The environment
The production process. Let fBtgt0 be a standard Brownian Motion on a proba-
bility space (
;F ; P ). The cumulative output Yt of a match of duration t is observed
by both parties and satises the stochastic integral equation
Yt =
Z t
0
( + as)ds+
Z t
0
dBs : (1)
5
The time-invariant productivity is denoted by  whereas at 2 [0; 1] is the e¤ort
provided by the agent. The agents action thus shifts average output but does not
directly a¤ect its volatility.
Learning. No one knows  at the outset, and common priors are normal with
mean m0 and precision h0. Posteriors over  depend on Yt and on cumulative e¤ort
At ,
R t
0
asds. Conditional on (Yt; At; t), they are also normal with mean
^(Yt   At; t) , Et [jYt; At] = h0m0 + 
 2 (Yt   At)
ht
; (2)
and with precision
ht , h0 +  2t : (3)
Focusing on normal priors over the mean of a normally distributed process enables
us to summarize all the statistically signicant information by just three variables:
cumulative output Y , cumulative e¤ort A and elapsed time t. Especially useful for
the characterization of optimal contracts is the fact that beliefs depend on the history
of a through A alone. Hence it is su¢ cient to keep track of cumulative e¤ort instead
of the whole e¤ort path.
Preferences. The agent is risk averse and cannot borrow and lend. For all t  0
and any given event ! 2 
, we dene a wage function w : R+  
 ! R. The agent
preferences as of time 0 read
U0 ,
Z 1
0
e tU (wt (!) ; at) dt ; (4)
with  > 0. Our specication of wages is quite general since they can depend on the
entire past and present fYs; 0  s  tg of the output process.
The principal is risk neutral and seeks to maximize output net of wages. His
inter-temporal preferences are
0 ,
Z 1
0
e t (dYt   wt (!)) dt ; (5)
where we have imposed a common discount rate for the agent and principal.
Long-term contract.We assume that the parties are able to commit to a long-
term contract that can depend on realized history in an arbitrary way. We follow the
usual practice of adding recommended e¤ort a to the contract denition. Accord-
ingly, since a given output path is a random element of the space 
, a contract is a
mapping (w; a) : R+  
 ! R  [0; 1] that associates at each time t a wage-e¤ort
pair to any output path. The mapping must be measurable based on information
that the principal has, and so, can depend on past output but not on past e¤ort.
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Otherwise contracts remain general since they can depend on the entire sample path
fYs; 0  s  tg of the output process.3
The principals beliefs. The principal assumes that the agent always takes his
equilibrium action at . His beliefs are governed by (2) in which A = A
 and by (3).
The agents beliefs. The agents beliefs incorporate the actual level of e¤ort a
which only he knows. Thus his beliefs are governed by (2) in which A and not A
enters. Let Fat ,  (Ys; as; 0  s  t) denote the ltration generated by (Y; a) and
Fa , fFat gt0 the P augmentation of this natural ltration. Denote by Zt the
cumulative surprise of someone who believes that Yt was accompanied by the e¤ort
sequence fas; 0  s  tg. The ltering theorem of Fujisaki et al. (1972) implies that
the innovation process
dZt ,
1

[dYt   (^(Yt   At; t) + at)dt] (6)
is a standard Brownian motion on the probability space (
;Fa; P ).4 Moreover, ^ is
a P martingale5 with decreasing variance:
d^(Yt   At; t) = 
 1
ht
dZt : (7)
The agent is restricted to the class of control processes A , fa : R+  
! [0; 1]g
that are Fa predictable.6 Given that the principal does not observe actual e¤ort a,
the information available to him is restricted to the ltration FYt ,  (Ys; 0  s  t)
generated by Y whose augmentation we denote by FY ,
FYt 	t0. An e¤ort path is
an equilibrium path when recommended and actual e¤ort do coincide, i.e., if at = at
for all (t; !).
3Given the di¤usion property of the output process, one should think of 
 = C ([0; T ] ;R) as
the space of continuous functions ! : [0; T ] ! R and of the process dened in (6) Zt (!) = ! (t),
0  t  T , as the coordinate mapping process with Wiener measure P on  
;FYt . Accordingly a
contract is a mapping (w; a) : R+  C ([0; T ] ;R)! R [0; 1] :
4As shown in Section 10.2. of Kallianpur (1980), the linearity of the ltering problem implies
that the ltrations generated by the output and innovation processes coincide. More formally, for
FZt ,  (Zs; 0  s  t), we have Fat = FZt .
5The equality follows directly from Itos lemma. Let Xt , Yt At denote cumulative output net
of cumulative e¤ort so that
d^(Xt; t) =
@^(Xt; t)
@t
dt+
@^(Xt; t)
@Xt
dXt =  
 2
ht
^(Xt; t) +
 2
ht
(^(Xt; t) + dZt) =
 1
ht
dZt :
6A mapping is predictable when it is P measurable, with P denoting the -algebra of predictable
subsets of the product space R+
, i.e. the smallest -algebra on R+
 making all left-continuous
and adapted processes measurable.
7
3 Incentive compatibility and implementability
This section focuses on the agents problem. We derive the necessary conditions for a
given action to be optimal and then establish a restriction under which they are also
su¢ cient. We impose a terminal date T on the contracting horizon. Until then, both
principal and agent are fully committed to the relationship. The agents continuation
value at time t reads
vt , max
a2A
E
Z T
t
e (s t)U
 
w(Y s); as

ds+ e (T t)W
 
Y T
Fat  ; (8)
where the output path is denoted by Y t , fYs; 0  s  tg and W () is the terminal
utility which depends on output history.7 The agent computes his continuation value
by taking a conditional expectation under the ltration Fat which varies with the level
of cumulative e¤ort. The principal, however, does not observe actual actions. Thus
he needs to keep track of continuation values for any potential level of cumulative
e¤ort. We shall simplify the problem by adopting a rst order approach: We focus
on the continuation value along the equilibrium path and then establish conditions
under which our solution is indeed globally optimal.
3.1 Necessary conditions for the agents problem
The optimization problem (8) cannot be analyzed with standard methods because
the objective function depends on the process wt which is non-Markovian. We in-
stead use a martingale approach. Faced with a contract w, the agent controls the
distribution of wt through his choice of e¤ort. Under this interpretation, the agent
chooses the probability measure over realizations of wt. The RadonNikodym deriv-
ative associated with any e¤ort path is a Markovian process, and so this approach
makes our optimization problem treatable with optimal control techniques.8
7Since we shall let T ! 1, we have assumed a tractable form for W . It is straightforward to
let W also depend on cumulative e¤ort A. Then one would have to adjust the stochastic process p
dened in equation (13) as follows
pt = E
"
 
Z T
t
e (s t)s
 2
hs
ds+ e (T t)WA
 
Y T ; AT
Fat
#
:
Apart from that, our results hold with few or no changes. The specication of the terminal utility
would matter if we were to focus on repeated contracts, with W capturing the agents outside
option and the ability of the principal to reward him at the end of the relationship. We do not
consider such generalizations because this paper focuses on the limit situation where both parties
are forever committed. Then, as long as standard transversality conditions hold, the specication
of the terminal utility is immaterial to the analysis.
8A more concise way to formulate the advantages of the martingale approach is to observe that
the control is not anymore closed loop but instead open loop with respect to the output process.
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The idea of applying this approach to principal-agent models goes back to Mirrlees
(1974). Our problem is complicated by the learning mechanism as past e¤orts a¤ect
not only current wages but also future expectations. We show in the Appendix how
this di¢ culty can be handled through an extension of the proof by Cvitani´c et al.
(2009) which leads to the necessary condition stated below.9
Proposition 1 There exists a unique decomposition for the agents continuation
value
dvt = [vt   U (wt; at)] dt+ tdZt ; (9)
vT = W (YT ) ; (10)
where  is a square integrable predictable process. The necessary condition for a to
be an optimal control reads
t + Et

 
Z T
t
e (s t)s
 2
hs
ds

+ Ua (wt; a
)

(a  a)  0 ; (11)
for all a 2 [0; 1] :
An increase in current e¤ort has two e¤ects: it raises the promised value along the
equilibrium path and increases cumulative e¤ort. The rst e¤ect is proportional to
the process  which measures the sensitivity of the agents value to output surprises.
The second e¤ect is captured by the expectation term in (11). This term vanishes
when  is known, since then  2=hs = 0 for all s  t. As a special case of our model,
we then get the necessary condition in Sannikov (2008) which says that an optimal
control must maximize the expected change in continuation value minus the marginal
cost of e¤ort.
Introducing parameter uncertainty leads to the addition of the expected future
sensitivities weighted by their precision ratios because they capture the marginal
impact of current e¤ort on expected earnings. To see this, observe rst that @^(Ys  
As; a)=@at =   2=hs for all s  t. Hence a marginal increase in at lowers date-s
posteriors about  by the amount  2=hs. The impact in utils follows multiplying
these marginal e¤ects by the expected value of the sensitivity parameter .
Analytically, (11) is more convenient when re-written as follows:
 2
ht
pt + t + Ua (wt; a
)

(a  a)  0 ; for all a 2 [0; 1] ; (12)
where
pt , htE

 
Z T
t
e (s t)s
1
hs
ds
Fat  (13)
9The necessary condition can also be derived using Williams(2008, 2009) method based on the
stochastic maximum principle.
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is a stochastic process capturing the value of private information.
The reformulated necessary condition (12) involves two stochastic variables, t
and pt. This is a usual result for dynamic contracts with private information.10 First,
we recover the now standard technique of using the promised value to encode past
history. A related interpretation can be inferred for p noticing that the incentive
constraint implied by (12) is
t   Ua (wt; at) 
 2
ht
pt : (14)
Given that the agent is risk averse, it is reasonable to conjecture that the principal
will minimize the volatility parameter . Hence, as long as at > 0; the necessary
condition (12) will hold with equality almost everywhere along the equilibrium path.
We show below that this indeed holds true when the agent has exponential utility. We
therefore replace t by the expression implied for it when (12) binds and, as shown
in Appendix B.1., obtain the following solution:
pt = E
Z T
t
e (s t)Ua (ws; as) ds
Fat  < 0 : (15)
Intuition behind (15). The second state variable p is equal to the expected
discounted marginal cost of future e¤orts. Multiplying it by the ratio  2=ht yields
the marginal e¤ect of cumulative e¤ort on the continuation value. The intuition for
this result can be laid out considering mimicking strategies. Fix Y t and lower At by
 > 0. Then dene a strategy enabling the agent to reproduce the payo¤s of an agent
with the reference level At of past e¤ort. Let at denote the optimal e¤ort at time t
of the reference policy with cumulative e¤ort At. By providing at = a

t    2=ht,11
the agent with cumulative e¤ort At   ensures that cumulative output will have the
same drift as along the reference path
^(Yt   (At   ) ; t) + at =
h0m0 + 
 2 (At   )
ht
+ at  
 2
ht
 = ^(Yt   At; t) + at :
Assume now that a similar strategy is employed afterwards, so that as = a

s  
( 2=ht)  for all s  t. Cumulative e¤ort will be As = As   [1 + ( 2=ht) (s  t)] 
10For example, Werning (2001) shows that in principal-agent problems with hidden savings, one
has to introduce both continuation value and expected marginal utility from consumption.
11Such strategies are not feasible when the reference control is at the lower bound, i.e., when
at = 0. One should therefore interpret our discussion of mimicking strategies as an heuristic one.
The rigorous interpretation being that of the expectation term E
h
  R T
t
s
 2
hs
ds
Fat i laid-out in
the paragraph above.
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leading to the following output drift
^(Y s As; s) + as =
h0m0+
 2 (As  [1+ ( 2=ht) (s  t)] )
hs
+as 
 2
ht

= ^(Y s As; s) + as 
 2
hths
264 ht+ 2 (s  t)| {z }
=hs
  hs
375= ^(Y s As; s) + as :
As desired, the mimicking strategy reproduces the distribution of Ys for all s  t and
the product   ( 2=ht) pt measures its expected discounted return in utils.12 It is
positive because it took the agent with cumulative e¤ort At more work to produce Yt,
implying that his productivity is likely to be lower. Returns decrease over time as the
inuence of output on beliefs is lower when  is known more precisely. This suggests
that incentives become easier to provide, a result that we will discuss at length in
Section 4.
3.2 Su¢ cient conditions for the agents problem
First-order conditions rely on the premise that the agents objective is globally con-
cave. Unfortunately, principal-agent problems do not always fulll such a require-
ment. In our case, establishing concavity is complicated by the persistence of private
information: As explained in the introduction, deviations from recommended e¤ort
drive a permanent wedge between the beliefs of the agent and that of the principal.
This is why excluding one shot deviations does not necessary rule out multiple devia-
tions. In order to clarify this distinction we introduce the notion of implementability
and refer to a control a as implementable if, when assigned the wage function satisfy-
ing the local incentive constraint (12) and the promise keeping constraints for v and
p; i.e., (9) and (18), the agent nds it optimal to provide e¤ort a.
How to establish implementability for discrete time contracts with persistent infor-
mation remains an open question.13 By contrast, when the model is cast in continuous
time, the su¢ ciency of the necessary conditions and thus the implementability of the
control follow from the concavity of the agents Hamiltonian. This general mathe-
matical result is summarized in Theorem 3.5.2 of Yong and Zhou (1999), and has
already been used in principal-agent settings by Schättler and Sung (1993) and more
12The correction term  2=ht required to mimic the output distribution remains constant over
time because of two countervailing mechanisms. One the one hand, as hs increases, the impact
of past deviations on posteriors decreases over time. On the other hand, the mimicking strategy
involves repeated deviations so that the gap between As and A

s widens over time. When the output
distribution is normal, these two opposite forces o¤set each other.
13The di¢ culties arising in discrete time settings are thoroughly discussed by Abraham and
Pavoni (2008). To circumvent them, they propose a numerical procedure verifying ex-post the
implementability of contracts with hidden e¤ort and savings. See also Kocherlakota (2008) for a
discussion of the problem and an analytical example.
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recently by Williams (2008). In our case, the agents Hamiltonian turns out to be
concave when the requirements stated in the following proposition are fullled.14
Proposition 2 A control a is implementable if (11) and
 2Uaa (wt; at)  ett2ht (16)
are true for almost all t, where  is the predictable process dened uniquely by
E

 
Z T
0
e ss
 2
hs
ds
Fat  E  Z T
0
e ss
 2
hs
ds
Fa0  = Z t
0
sdZs; for all t 2 [0; T ] :
(17)
According to (15), the process t is the random uctuation in the discounted sum
of marginal utilities as evaluated from time 0. These restrictions are stronger than
required so that a control might violate them and nevertheless be implementable.
Moreover, (16) and (17) are stated in terms of t which is endogenous, implying that
(16) has to be veried ex-post for any given contract. In some cases, however, one can
translate (16) and (17) into a requirement on the parameters of the model. Indeed,
when the agents utility function is as in (20), we shall show that (16) and (17) will
hold if (27) holds.
Finally, observe that letting the horizon T go to innity allows us to discard the
terminal condition (10) as long as the transversality condition limT!1 e tW
 
Y T

is satised. Then we can replace the Backward Stochastic Di¤erential Equation15 (9)
by a Stochastic Di¤erential Equation (SDE hereafter) and express the law of motion
of the stochastic process p as follows.
Corollary 1 In the innite horizon case, pt (dened in (15)) satises
dpt =

pt

+
 2
ht

+ t

dt+ #tdZt ; (18)
with
#t , et2htt
where t is dened in (17):
14The concavity requirement derived in Williams (2008) tends to be violated by his principal-
agent problem. Corollary 2 below shows that this is not necessarily the case in our model because
implementability is not anymore an issue when parameter precision ht goes to innity.
15A Backward Stochastic Di¤erential Equation is a Stochastic Di¤erential Equation on which a
terminal condition has been imposed. In our case, we assumed that the agents value vt equals
W
 
Y t

at the end of the contracting horizon, i.e., when t = T .
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4 Optimal contract under exponential utility
We now show how one can solve for the principals problem and derive the optimal
contract in closed form when attention is restricted to commitment over an innite
horizon and exponential utility functions. The main idea is to simplify the optimiza-
tion program by eliminating two states: The rst one is a component of the su¢ cient
statistics for beliefs, ^; and the second one is the value of private information, p. We
now describe how each of these is dealt with.
Eliminating ^ from the list of states. According to (5) the principals problem
has an innite horizon, so that his objective reads16
Jt , E
Z 1
t
e s (^(Ys   As; s) + as   ws) ds
FYt 
=

e t


^(Yt   At ; t) + E
Z 1
t
e s (as   ws) ds
FYt  :
The equality follows because the agent is risk neutral and beliefs are a martingale.
This implies that one of the two su¢ cient statistics of beliefs, the mean, can be
dispensed with as a state, leaving only precision as the remaining belief state, and
since ht is deterministic, we may index precision by t. This illustrates that incentives
are optimally designed to reward e¤ort and not ability.
The principals optimization problem can therefore be recast as17
jt , maxfa;w;;#gE
Z 1
t
e s (as   ws) ds
FYt  ;
subject to the two promise-keeping constraints (9) and (18) and subject to the in-
centive constraint (14): One can assume that the incentive constraint (14) holds with
equality almost everywhere because, as shown below, the principals value function
is concave in the promised value v so that he would like to lower the volatility in v
as much as possible. Hence we can treat the volatility term t =  Ua (w; a)   2ht pt
as a function of the other controls. Furthermore, (15) implies that the deterministic
trend for p is equal to p  Ua (w; a) when (14) binds.
The resulting optimization problem is a standard one since, by (9) and (18), the
state variables (v; p) are Markovian. We are therefore justied in using a Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation in order to characterize the principals value func-
16Prots are discounted from date 0 for analytical convenience.
17We use a strong formulation for the principals problem even though we have used a weak
formulation to solve for the agents problem. This change of solution method is usual for principal-
agent models. Yet, as discussed in Cvitanic et al. (2009), it may lead to measurability issues if the
optimal action directly depends on the Brownian motion. In our case, however, a turns out to be
constant over time so that measurability of the optimal control will not be problematic.
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tion.18 If we had to keep all three states (t; v; p), the HJB equation would read
0 = max
fa;w;#g
(
e t (a  w) + @j
@t
+ @j
@v
(v   U (w; a)) + @j
@p
(p  Ua (w; a))
+
2
2
h
@2j
@v2
 (t; p; w; a)2 + @
2j
@p2
#2 + 2 @
2j
@vp
 (t; p; w; a)#
i ) : (19)
We can, however, reduce the list of states by eliminating p; and this will simplify (19)
considerably.
Eliminating p from the list of states. In order to dispense with p as a state, we
assume the following utility function:19
U(w; a) =   exp(  (w   a)) ; with  2 (0; 1) ; (20)
for a 2 [0; 1] : Imposing  < 1 ensures that the rst-best action is a = 1 because
the marginal utility of an additional unit of output exceeds the marginal cost of
e¤ort regardless of .20 The utility is dened even for negative consumption which in
equilibrium occurs with positive probability.
When U(a; w) is given by (20), the problem greatly simplies because Ua (w; a) =
U (w; a). Then (8) and (15) imply that
pt = vt :
The proportionality of v and p means that keeping track of one of the two states is
su¢ cient.21 This further reduces the dimensionality of the problem and allows us to
rewrite the HJB equation (19) as
0 = max
fa;wg

e t (a  w) + @j
@t
+
@j
@v
(v   U (w; a)) +

2
2

@2j
@v2
 (t; v; w; a)2

:
(21)
Given that e¤ort levels lie in a compact set, the recommended action satises
e t   @j
@v
Ua (w; a) + 
2 @
2j
@v2
 (t; v; w; a)
@ (t; v; w; a)
@a
 0 ;
18Appendix B.2 shows that the HJB equations dened below can be extended to include ^ and
would still be satised.
19Even though the full characterization of the contract will hold only for utilities of the form (20),
the optimality conditions derived in Section 3 hold independently of this parametric restriction. One
of its implications is that there is no wealth e¤ect on leisure because Uw=Ua =   1, a constant
independent of w.
20Accordingly, one could interpret our model as resulting from a situation where the agent is able
to divert cash ows 1   a at the rate . As in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2009), setting  below
one ensures that cash diversion entails linear losses. Our problems di¤er because DeMarzo and
Sannikov (2009) focus on risk neutral agents whereas we introduce risk aversion by taking a concave
transformation of the agents income net of his opportunity cost a:
21To the best of our knowledge, this simplication of the principals problem with private infor-
mation and exponential utility was rst noticed by Williams (2008).
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whereas wages take value over the real line and so fulll the optimality condition
 e t   @j
@v
Uw (w; a) + 
2 @
2j
@v2
 (t; v; w; a)
@ (t; v; w; a)
@w
= 0 :
Using once again the fact that the Incentive Constraint (14) holds with equality,
we obtain @=@w =  @=@a >  @=@a, which implies in turn that, when the
optimality condition for wages binds, the one for e¤ort is not tight. It follows that
optimal e¤ort is constant and set equal to the upper-bound a = 1. Fixing the agents
action to its rst best level allows us to solve for the value function by guess-and-verify.
Proposition 3 Assume that U is as specied in (20). Then the recommended e¤ort
is set equal to the rst best level a = 1 and the principals value function is of the
form
j (t; v) =
e t


j0 (t) +
ln ( v)


; (22)
The function j0 (t) is the unique solution of the rst order ODE
j00 (t)  j0 (t) =  

1  + ln( kt)


+
 ()2
2

1
4h2t
  k2t

; (23)
with boundary condition limt!1 j00 (t) = 0 and kt being given by the negative root of
the quadratic equation
k2t ()
2   kt

1 +
1
ht
()2

   = 0 : (24)
The optimal wage is
wt (v) =  
ln(ktv)

+  ; (25)
and the optimal volatility reads
t (v) =  tv , 

kt   
 2
ht

v : (26)
To establish the implementability of the rst best action, remember that our
parametrization of U (w; a) is such that pt = vt. Consequently, the volatility terms
t and #

t must also remain proportional. Reinserting #

t = 

t into (16) and using
the explicit solution (26) for t yields the following requirement.
Corollary 2 First best e¤ort is implementable (i.e., meets conditions (11) and (16))
when
2 >
1
h0
+ 2 ()2
1
h20
: (27)
Since precision ht is increasing with time, the condition then holds at all subsequent
dates as ht > h0.
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The su¢ cient condition (27) is more likely to hold when: Both parties are im-
patient, output noise is high, the marginal cost of e¤ort  is low, the coe¢ cient of
absolute risk aversion  is small, or parameter precision h0 is high. Indeed, (27)
always holds in the limit case without parameter uncertainty (h0 = 1) because
multiple deviations are not anymore a concern.
We shall henceforth assume that our parameters satisfy (27). The condition is
su¢ cient and not necessary, however, and our comparative statics results hold in-
dependently of it, which suggests that they are robust over a wider region of the
parameter space.
5 Characterization of the optimal contract
The optimal wage process described in (25) has a declining volatility, as well as a
drift converging to a negative limit. The rst property appears to be quite general,
and should hold for any utility function. The second property is specic to the
parametrization in (20) : The following arguments will suggest that if we could solve
the problem for a utility function for which the inverse marginal utility of income
(1=U 0 (w)) is concave in w, the drift would converge to a positive limit.
5.1 Wage dynamics
The mechanism driving wage volatility is the decrease in the ability of the agent to
manipulate beliefs as they become more precise over time. It enables the principal
to sustain rst best e¤ort with less variance and to trade lowers wages in exchange
of more stable income. This channel is easily derived from the analytical expression
(25) for wages.
Corollary 3 For any given promised value v, the optimal wage wt (v) is a decreasing
function of beliefs precision and thus time.
Corollary 3 does not directly apply to income dynamics because the promised
value v evolves over time. To obtain the law of motion of v, we reinsert the optimal
volatility t (v) dened in (26) into the SDE (9)
dvt = vt [(+ kt) dt+  tdZt] : (28)
Since kt is the negative root of (24), the drift of the promised value can be positive
or negative. Its sign indicates how earnings are allocated over time: When the drift
is positive, wages are back loaded, meaning that the expected average wage is above
its current level. Conversely, when the trend is negative, payments are front loaded.
Given that kt is decreasing over time,22 the principal resorts more intensively to
22See the proof of Corollary 3.
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Figure 2: Wage dynamics as a function of contract duration
back loading when parameter uncertainty is higher. Payments are deferred because
incentives can be provided at a cheaper cost in the future through higher income
stabilization.
Accordingly, income dynamics result from the interaction of the following three
mechanisms: (i) For a constant promised value, wages decrease over time, as stated in
Corollary 3; (ii) Back loading weakens over time, raising current income; (iii) Wages
are driven downwards by the agents immiserization. Of the three channels, only the
rst two are specic to the learning process whereas the third one remains relevant
when belief precision is innite. Deriving the law of motion of wages allows one to
analytically identify each mechanism. The optimal wage at time t as a function of
the promised value v is given by
wt =  

1


[ln( kt) + ln( vt) + ] ;
so that its law of motion reads
dwt =  

1


1
kt

dkt + d ln( vt)

: (29)
17
Reinserting from (28) into (29) and applying Itos lemma to the logarithmic trans-
formation of v yields the reduced formfor wage growth
dwt =
1

0BBB@  dkt=dtkt| {z }
Income Stabilization
+
()2
2

 1
ht
2
| {z }
Back Loading
 ()
2
2
k2t| {z }
Immiserization
1CCCA dt+  t dZt : (30)
The rst two terms in the expression for the trend are due to parameter uncertainty
and they vanish when belief precision ht is innite. The trend and volatility terms in
(30) are both deterministic, and are plotted in the second and third panels of Figure
2. The assumed parameter values are shown in Table 1. They will be used as baseline
numbers for all the simulations reported below.
 2   h0
0.1 0.5 1 0.5 20.48
Table 1
The value h0 = 20:48 is the smallest precision that satises the second-order condition
(27) given the assumed values of the other parameters. The middle panel of Figure 2
shows that the trend is increasing over time. Hence, parameter uncertainty reinforces
the immiserization process because the back loading channel is dominated by the
income stabilization channel. This is not a general result, however, as other parameter
constellations yield decreasing or even hump-shaped proles for the deterministic
trend.
The third term in the trend in (30) captures the agents immiserization which is
specic to the utility function (20). It follows from the inverse Euler equation that
can be established in the innite-precision limit using Itos lemma
d

1
@U=@wt

=  
v
dZt ; when
 2
ht
= 0 :
Under (20), (@U=@w) 1 = exp ( [w   ]) = is convex in w, hence the immiserization.
However, if utility were U (c) = c1 = (1  ) and  < 1, (@U=@w) 1 = c would be
concave and the inverse Euler equation would imply that wages exhibit a positive
trend. In the knife-edge case  = 1, the utility would be logarithmic and wages
would follow a martingale.
The top panel of Figure 2 plots the mean wage and the one-standard-deviation
bands for the parameter values in Table 1. The stochastic term dZ is the output
surprise dened in (6), which means that the solution wt to the stochastic di¤erence
equation is a normally distributed random variable, and that the distribution of wages
at date t is the frequency distribution of wages among age-t workers with abilities
randomly drawn from   N  0; h 10 . By normality, the bands are equidistant from
the mean, hence, symmetric.
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Now, from (48) we nd that kt has a strictly negative limit so that
jktj ! 1
2
 s
1
()2
2
+
4
()2
  1
()2
!
> 0 ;
implying that the volatility of the wage increments does not die o¤ t 
 = kt    2ht
!  jk1j > 0 :
Since these increments are independent, the cross-section variance of wages converges
to innity. We sum up our ndings in the Corollary below, whereas Figure 2 illustrates
them.
Corollary 4 The volatility of the wage increments is decreasing to a positive limit
so that the cross-sectional variance of wages grows without bound. Provided that the
su¢ cient condition (16) is satised, wages exhibit a negative trend.
5.2 Value of Commitment
Instead of focusing on wage dynamics within a given match, we can use the model to
compare the value of commitment across di¤erent environments. As discussed in the
Introduction and in Section 6 below, the total surplus is decreasing in prior precision
when wages are set through spot contracts. To the contrary, when parties are able to
commit, the surplus is higher when priors are more accurate.
Corollary 5 The principals expected lifetime prot as a function of the value v
promised to the agent is increasing in the prior precision h0.
The intuition for this result directly follows from Corollary 3: An increase in the
precision with which the productivity of the match is known enables the principal to
stabilize further the agents income. As contracts get closer to the second best, the
principal can deliver the promised value v at a lower expected cost.
Figure 3 plots the agents value as a function of the prior variance 1=h0 and of the
marginal cost of e¤ort parameter , holding the principals value constant at zero.
The vertical line labeled su¢ cient conditionidenties the maximal prior variance
1=h0 and  above which implementability holds surely. The other parameters are
as given in Table 1. In particular, (27) (which involves both  and h) holds to the
left of the solid black line. For the parameter values used in the plot, (27) reads
1
20
> 1
h0
+ 2


h0
2
; and so the maximal  as a function of h is given by
 =
s
h0
2

h0
20
  1

: (31)
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Figure 3: Agents value as a function of 1=h0 and 
The RHS of this equation is positive only if h0  20: In other words, (27) can be
met only if 1=h0 < 5%, and then more easily if  is low enough. Once h0  21:83,
however, the RHS of (31) exceeds unity, and (27) then holds for all  2 [0; 1].
As stated in Corollary 5, the agents value is decreasing in the prior variance 1=h0.
Figure 3 also illustrates how an increase in  lowers the surplus because it intensies
the moral hazard problem, thus making it more costly for the principal to deliver a
given utility level.
Williams (2009) proves qualitatively similar results in a reporting problem with
persistent income shocks: E¢ ciency losses due to private information increase with
the persistence of the endowment and, parallel to our result that the principal back
loads payments more when ht is lower, Williams also nds that persistence of shocks
leads to a tendency to back load payments that is absent in reporting problems with
i.i.d. shocks.
6 Limited vs. full commitment
Our full-commitment solution applies equally to various interpretations for ; it can
denote the agents general ability fully transferable across matches, it can denote a
match-specic productivity, or any combination of the two. Which interpretation
one adopts can a¤ect the solution only via the positioning of the initial point on the
Pareto frontier. Under limited commitment, however, the form of the participation
constraints will depend on the interpretation of .
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Figure 4: lifetime rents of the agents in the three models.
We now wish to relate our model to the literature on reputations that typically
adopts the interpretation that  is general ability. We shall focus on two models
of reputations. The rst, considered by Holmström (1999; Hhereafter), assumes
spot-market wages that may reect the workers history but cannot reect current
output. The second, considered by Gibbons and Murphy (1992; G-Mhereafter)
allows wages to respond linearly to performances during the period at hand. Since
G-M have some form of partial commitment, the G-M agents receive a higher utility
after every history than the H agents.
In both H and G-M the principal is assumed to be risk neutral, and they impose
zero expected prots for the principal after every history and at each date. The agents
utility functions, however, di¤er from our assumed form in (4) and (20): H assumes
that agents are risk-neutral and have time-additive utility, whereas G-M assumes
that agents are risk averse but that their utility is not time separable. To make our
analysis of commitment comparable to their analyses of limited commitment, we shall
derive the equilibria of H and G-M in our environment, i.e., for the case where the
agent has lifetime utility (4) and period utility (20). This is the only change we make
to H and G-M.
In our model (P-Jhereafter), the principal has full commitment and his prots
will not be zero at an arbitrary date. To compare our solution to H and G-M, it is
natural to impose zero expected lifetime prots on the principal at the outset. Thus
we shall assume that at date zero, the agent gets all the rents from the relationship.
If we maintain the same belief about  across the three models, and if we use vH,
vG-M; and vP-J to denote the agents lifetime utility, then they are related as shown
in Figure 4.
The relation depicted in Figure 4 exists only at the outset, when under commit-
ment risk-neutral rms compete for the agent. Of course, here we are discussing
three separate economies each with its own distinct contracting arrangement, and
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Figure 5: Effort as a function of precision in spot markets.
not a single economy in which lifetime contracts and spot contracts could coexist.
We now wish to transport this intuition to the behavior of wages.
6.1 Ex-ante payments
In this section we show that the equilibrium behavior of wages and e¤ort under risk
aversion is essentially the same as in H: Reputational concerns are the only reason
why the agent exerts any e¤ort, and when information about  accumulates and as
these concerns disappear, his e¤ort converges to zero, just as in the risk-neutral case.
Of itself this is not surprising. Rather, the result is useful because it enables us to
isolate the role that full commitment plays in generating economic outcomes for the
parties to the contract.
Employers cannot commit to paying wages that depend on performance, and
competition among employers bids wages up to expected output. Denoting as before
equilibrium actions by an asterisk, expected productivity reads:
wt = ^ (Yt   At ; t) + at : (32)
In H, equilibrium action entails a strictly declining deterministic sequence for at :
E¤ort is sustained by the markets imprecise knowledge of  and the agents attempts
to raise the markets expectation. With our utility function and a spot market, the
sequence at also decreases, eventually reaching zero and remaining there, as drawn in
Figure 5 and described in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (i) The equilibrium e¤ort path at is deterministic, and it depends on
t only through ht = h0 +  2t, as drawn in Figure 5.
(ii) There exist two numbers h1 and h2 satisfying 0  h1  h2 such that (A) a (h) = 1
for h  h1; (B) a (h) is strictly decreasing for h 2 (h1; h2) ; and (C) a (h) = 0 for
22
h  h2.
(iii)(A) If
 <
Z 1
0
e 
"
 2
h0 +  2

exp
 
2
2

 2
h0 +  2
2  
2 + h 10
!#
d : (33)
then h2 > 0. (B) h1 < h2. Moreover, if
@U (m0; 1)
@a
+
Z 1
0
e t
@
@Y
E0 [U (^ (Yt   At; s) ; 1)] ds > 0 ; (34)
then (C) h1 > 0, i.e., an initial horizontal segment at a = 1 exists.
The following properties are of note:
1. Since a depends on t only through the e¤ect that t has on h, lowering the initial
precision of the prior (i.e. decreasing h0) raises the time T at which the agent
stops providing e¤ort. In (a; t) space, the entire e¤ort path shifts to the right.
2. Since at is deterministic, wage volatility is declining with experience because
the volatility of ^ is declining with t. Of course, conditional on ^ and h, the
wage is not random.
3. Since rst-best e¤ort is equal to the upper bound of unity, e¤ort cannot ever
exceed its rst-best level. In terms of welfare this is the only di¤erence from H.
Recall that the equilibrium wage is ^ + at . If we normalize the mean of  to zero
(as we shall do throughout this section), the average equilibrium wage is
wHt = a

t ; (35)
with the sequence of at depicted in Figure 5. The e¢ cient level a = 1 is implementable
only early on, and wages reect that fact. We shall compare P-J with H in a simulation
of both using the parameter values in Table 1. Figure 6 reports the simulation result.
We choose h0 = 20:48 so that the contract under commitment is implementable. But
this level of precision is too high to generate a reputational concern in the H model
that would be su¢ cient to sustain rst-best e¤ort a = 1. Indeed, by period 3, e¤ort
has already reached zero. Therefore wHt starts out below unity and itself reaches zero
by period 3. Wages in both models are normally distributed at each date and Figure
6 shows that most agents would receive higher wages under commitment than they
would in the spot market, but that commitment entails more wage dispersion.
The distribution of lifetime utilities.While Figure 6 shows the distribution of
wages across agents at each date, it does not accurately represent the distribution
of lifetime gains that full commitment o¤ers. That would be the distribution of the
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random variable U0 dened in (4), which we report in Figure 7.23 Commitment largely
dominates spot agreements: On average, it raises the agents utility by 37%,24 which
is equivalent to an increase of 89:2% in wages across rst best allocations.25 Even
though utilities derived from contracts exhibit more dispersion, they dominate from
a stochastic point of view. While wages themselves are normally distributed, utilities
are nonlinear and bounded above. This is why the resulting distributions of U0 are
skewed to the left, and more so for commitment. As a result, the means (represented
by the vertical lines) are to the left of the modes.
6.2 Ex-post linear payments
Between the extremes of the no-commitment model H on the one hand and the full-
commitment model P-J on the other, there is the partial-commitment model G-M in
which a contract lasts one period: Wage are paid at the end of each period and can
depend linearly on output that period. The market is otherwise still a spot market
as there is no contracting for more than one period. Expected prots must still
equal zero, but the set of contracts is richer than in H, as it also includes piece rate
compensations. The G-M solution therefore provides the agent with a higher expected
utility than the H solution, but a lower lifetime utility than our full-commitment
solution.
We use discrete time to explain the G-M results for our utility function. A remark
about eq. (1). First, if at is continuous, (1) can be thought of as the limit of the
following discrete time process when the interval length  converges to zero
Y t ,
t=X
i=1

( + ai) + "i
p


;
where ai = ai, and where "i is an i.i.d. shock with unit variance.26
Assume then, that output is yt = at++"t. Since wages are restricted to be linear
in output, we can denote the one-period wage function by wt = b0;t + b1;tyt. We now
simulate our solution together with the piece-rate spot-market solution along with
23The distribution of lifetime utilities in both models is obtained through Monte Carlo simulations.
We simulate 10000 sample paths and compute the resulting kernel densities. The accuracy of the
procedure is conrmed by the approximation error of less than one percent between the simulated
and theoretical average utility in the commitment scenario.
24The welfare gain is obtained dividing the di¤erence between the expected utilities E0 [U0] with
and without commitment by the expected utility when wages are set on the spot market, i.e.,
( 9:792 + 6:162) =  9:792 = 0:37:
25We rst derive the wage such that U (w; 1) =r = E0 [U0] ; which yields wCom = 0:984 under
commitment and wSpot = 0:52 under spot market. The compensating variation follows taking the
di¤erence between the two wages and dividing it by wSpot, i.e., (0:984  0:52) =0:52 = 0:8923:
26In (1) only mean output depends on a, not its variance. For if, instead,  also depended on
a, say as  (a), the principal could perfectly infer  (a) and hence a; from the observed quadratic
variation of Y as ! 0, for then the signal-noise ratio becomes unbounded.
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Figure 8: Mean wage and standard deviation bands of commitment wages
and piece-rate wages
the one-standard-deviation bands for the two models. The piece-rate contracts can
implement the e¢ cient level of e¤ort. This will be achieved if  is small enough and
as long as the zero-expected-prot constraint holds. We know that E [w] = E [y] =
1 + ^; and therefore for the mean agent wGMt = 1, for all t, ensuring that piece-rate
contracts are linear with zero prot on a period-by-period basis. Observe that in
the commitment solution we impose a zero expected lifetime value on the principal,
whereas in the spot-market solution the expected prot is zero in each period.
At each t, wages maximize the agents lifetime utility subject to non-negativity of
prots
E [wt] = b0;t + b1;t (^t + a

t )  ^t + at ; (36)
and subject to incentive compatibility (see (11) and its simplication in (56) and
(58)). Details are in Appendix C.
Equation (59) reports the standard deviation of the piece-rate wage to beq
h 10   h 1t 1 + 2b21;t  !
t!1
q
h 10 + 
2=2 =
q
(20:48) 1 + 1=8 = 0:4169 :
It is bounded because level shocks are assumed to be i.i.d.. To the contrary, the
standard deviation of wages under commitment diverges to innity since, as noted in
Corollary 4, the variance of its increments does not die o¤. Yet, for most of the periods
reported in Figure 8, the cross-sectional variance of commitment wages is smaller than
that of piece-rate wages. It takes around 50 periods for the standard-deviation bands
under commitment to become wider than the piece-rate bands. Surprisingly, the
26
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Figure 9: Distribution of lifetime utilities under piece rates and com-
mitment
standard deviations of piece-rate wages take a long time to stabilize. In Appendix C,
Figure 10, we show that this is because b1;t is slow to converge to .
We note, however, that the component 2b21;t represents the contribution of transi-
tory wages, which means that increments to wages are more variable in the piece-rate
case, more persistent under commitment. This is why one can easily be mislead by
Figure 8 into believing that there are not much gains to commitment. Yet Figure 8
does not inform us about the cross-sectional distributions of lifetime utilities which
turn out to be quite di¤erent across models, as can be seen from Figure 9. Even
though the gap is smaller than with spot wages (the distribution on the right is
for U0; the same, of course, as the distribution in Figure 7), commitment still o¤ers
a noticeably higher expected lifetime utility E0 [U0]: Long-term contracts raise the
agents utility by 18:8%, a gain that is equivalent to a compensating variation of
25:9% in wages across rst best allocations.27 Furthermore, stochastic dominance
continues to hold so that not only the average worker but most workers do benet
from contracting.
6.3 Other remarks on limited commitment
 as a match-specic ability. If, instead of denoting general ability,  were match
specic, then neither the optimal contract nor the Pareto frontier would change under
27For an explanation of how these statistics are derived, see footnotes 24 and 25.
27
full commitment. By contrast, spot-markets would work poorly. The agent now has
no reputational concern, and receives lower lifetime utility. With up-front wages as
in H, all reputational concerns disappear; implying that e¤ort would remain constant
at zero. The wage would equal Et [] at all dates and so the median agent would
receive a wage of zero. On the other hand, linear piece rates, i.e., contracts of the
G-M type, would sustain rst-best e¤ort, but with a contract that does not change
over time:
b0;t = 1   and b1;t = 
for all t. The mean wage would remain constant wGMt = 1 at the level where the
principal breaks even. The value of commitment is then even larger than in the case
where ability is transferable and again increasing in the precision of the match-quality
parameter.
Participation constraints and equilibrium. In this section we have described three
separate economies, each with its own contracting protocol determined by the agents
ability to commit. The P-J solution is for a contract that would yield the principal
zero expected prot at the outset, but after some histories his expected prot will
fall below zero. Similarly, the agents continuation value may fall below vP-J and
even below vH. An extension would add participation constraints as Rudanko (2010)
and Lustig et al. (2007) have done for multi-agent environments without learning.
In partial equilibrium settings without learning there are more papers with limited
commitment. Closely related to ours is the principal-agent model of Sannikov (2008)
which, under some adjustments to the parametric form of the utility function, is
encompassed in our framework as h0 ! 1, i.e., when posteriors have converged to
the true value of . More precisely, Sannikov considers a utility function that is (i)
dened over the positive real line; (ii) bounded from below; and (iii) separable in
income and e¤ort. By contrast, our utility function (20) is not bounded from below
and, as a result, we do not have a low retirement point. Observe, however, that
our characterization of the agents necessary condition (11) does not depend on the
parametric assumption (20) and so coincides with Sannikovs when h0 =1.
7 Conclusion
We have solved a contracting problem involving parameter uncertainty and described
a mechanism by which uncertainty about the environment worsens the incentive in-
surance trade-o¤. We developed an approach that works for any utility function
when the parameter and noise are normally distributed. We found that the agent
faces two opposite e¤ects when considering a downward deviation from recommended
e¤ort. On the one hand, he will be punished by a lower promised value because of
the decrease in observable output. On the other hand, he will benet from higher
expectations than the principal about the unknown productivity of the match. This
28
second channel that we label belief manipulation is specic to problems under para-
meter uncertainty. The extent to which it inuences incentive provisions depends on
the remaining length of the relationship. This is why it is not relevant in markets
based on spot agreements.
Although the prospect of belief manipulation reduces the gains from commitment,
it does not eliminate them altogether. We found, in particular, that the Pareto
frontier shifts out when information about quality improves, and this we contrasted
to spot markets where, at least when ability is transferable, the Pareto frontier shifts
inwards. Therefore incentives are easier to provide and commitment is more valuable
when the agents quality is known more precisely. In further contrast to results under
partial commitment, wage volatility under full commitment declines with experience.
Thus, we have shown that parameter uncertainty makes it harder to reward e¤ort
under full commitment, in direct contrast to its tendency to stimulate e¤ort in spot
markets. However, spot and full commitment settings are both highly stylized depic-
tions of how markets operate in reality. We therefore believe that the most promising
task would be to combine the two environments in a model with limited commitment
so as to evaluate how the two incentive channels interact.
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Appendix A: Proofs of propositions and corollaries
Proof. Proposition 1: Consider the Brownian motion Z0 under some probabil-
ity space with probability measureQ, and FZ0 ,
n
FZ0t
o
0tT
the suitably augmented
ltration generated by Z0. Let
Yt =
Z t
0
dZ0s ;
so that Yt is also a Brownian motion under Q. Given that expected output is linear
in cumulative output,28 the exponential local martingale
at; , exp
 Z 
t

^(Ys   As; s) + as


dZ0s  
1
2
Z 
t
 ^(Ys   As; s) + as
2 ds
!
; t    T ;
is a martingale, i.e. Et

at;T

= 1. Hence Girsanov theorem holds and ensures that
Zat , Z0t  
Z t
0

^(Ys   As; s) + as


ds
is a Brownian motion under the new probability measure dP a=dP , a0;T . Given that
both measures are equivalent, the triple (Y; Za; Qa) is a weak solution of the SDE
Yt =
Z t
0
(^(Ys   As; s) + as) ds+
Z t
0
dZas :
Adopting a weak formulation allows us to view the choice of control a as determin-
ing the probability measure Qa. In order to dene the agents optimization problem,
let Ra (t) denote the reward from time t onwards so that
Ra (t) , et
Z T
t
U
 
s; Y s; as

ds+W
 
T; Y T

;
where, with a slight abuse of notation, U
 
s; Y s; as

, e sU
 
w
 
Y s

; as

andW
 
T; Y T

,
e TW
 
Y T

are utilities at time t discounted from time 0. The agents objective is
to nd an admissible control process that maximizes the expected reward Ea [Ra (0)]
over all admissible controls a 2 A. In other words, the agent solves the following
problem
vt = sup
a2A
V a(t) , sup
a2A
Eat [R
a (t)] ; for all 0  t  T :
28More formally, the martingale property holds true because
j^(Yt  At; t) + atj  K
 
1 +
Z0
t

; for all t 2 [0; T ] ;
with K = 
 1
h0
+ 1 and
Z0
t
, max0st
Z0 (s) :
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The objective function can be recast as
V a(t) = Eat [R
a (t)] = Et

at;TR
a (t)

; (37)
where the operator Ea [] and E [] are expectation under the probability measure
Qa and Q, respectively. One can see from (37) that varying a is indeed equivalent
to changing the probability measure. The key advantage of the weak formulation
is that, under the reference measure Q, the output process does not depend on a.
Hence, we can treat it as xed which enables us to solve our problem in spite of its
non-Markovian structure.
Our derivation of the necessary conditions builds on the variational argument in
Cvitani´c et al. (2009). Dene the control perturbation
a" , a+ "a ;
such that there exists an "0 > 0 for which any " 2 [0; "0) satisfy ja"j4 ;
Ua"4 ; Ua"a 4 ; a"t; 4, Ua"t;2 and  @aUa"t;2 being uniformly integrable in L1 (Q) where
Uat; ,
Z 
t
U
 
s; Y s; as

ds :
We introduce the following shorthand notations for "variations"
rUat; ,
Z 
t
Ua
 
s; Y s; as

asds ; (38)
rAt ,
Z t
0
asds ; (39)
rat; , at;

1

Z 
t

 
 2
hs
rAs +as

dZ0s  
Z 
t
(^s + as)

 
 2
hs
rAs +as

ds

= at;

1

Z 
t

 
 2
hs
rAs +as

dZas : (40)
Step 1: We rst characterize the variations of the agents objective with respect
to "
V a
"
(t)  V a(t)
"
= E

a
"
t;TR
a" (t)  at;TRa (t)

= E
" 
a
"
t;T   at;T
"
!
Ra
"
(t) + at;T

Ra
"
(t) Ra (t)
"
#
= E

ra"t;TRa
"
(t) + at;T

Ra
"
(t) Ra (t)
"

:
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To obtain the limit of the rst term as " goes to zero, observe that
ra"t;TRa
"
(t) rat;TRa (t) =
ra"t;T  rt;T Ra (t) +ra"t;T Ra" (t) Ra (t) :
As shown in Cvitani´c et al. (2009), for any " 2 [0; "0), this expression is integrable
uniformly with respect to " and so
lim
"!0
E
ra"t;TRa" (t) = E rat;TRa (t) :
The limit of the second term reads
lim
"!0
Ra
"
(t) Ra (t)
"
= etrUat;T :
Due to the uniform integrability of at;T
 
Ra
"
(t) Ra (t) =", the expectation is also
well dened. Combining the two expressions above, we nally obtain
lim
"!0
V a
"
(t)  V a(t)
"
= E
rat;TRa (t) + at;T etrUat;T  , rV a(t) : (41)
Step 2: We are now in a position to derive the necessary condition. Consider
total earnings as of date 0
Ia(t) , Eat
Z T
0
U
 
s; Y s; as

ds+W
 
T; Y T

=
Z t
0
U
 
s; Y s; as

ds+ e tV a(t) :
(42)
By denition, it is a Qa martingale. According to the extended Martingale Repre-
sentation Theorem29 of Fujisaki et al. (1972), all square integrable Qa martingales
are stochastic integrals of fZat g and there exists a unique process  in L2 (Qa) such
that
Ia(T ) = Ia(t) +
Z T
t
sdZ
a
s : (43)
This decomposition allows us to solve for rV a(t). Reinserting (38), (39) and (40)
into (41) yields30
rV a(t) = Et

at;TR
a (t) 1
Z T
t

 
 2
hs
rAs+as

dZas + 
a
t;T e
t
Z T
t
Uaasds

= etEat

Ia(T ) 1
Z T
t

 
 2
hs
rAs+as

dZas+
Z T
t
Uaasds

:
29We cannot directly apply the standard Martingale Representation theorem because we are con-
sidering weak solutions, so that fZat g does not necessarily generate
FYt 	.
30The additional expectation term vanishes because both

h"
hs

rAs and as are bounded and soZ t
0
U
 
 ; Y  ; a

d

Eat
"Z T
t

 

h"
hs

rAs +as

dZas
#
= 0 :
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where subscripts denote derivatives and arguments are omitted for brevity. Given
the law of motion (43), applying Itos rule to the rst term yields
d

Ia()
Z 
t

 
 2
hs
rAs +as

dZas

=



 

 2
h

rA +a

d
+


Z 
t

 
 2
hs
rAs +as

dZas + I
a
t ()

 

 2
h

rA +a

dZa :
Hence rV a(t) can be represented as
e trV a(t) = Eat
Z T
t
 1sds+
Z T
t
 2sdZ
a
s

;
where
 1s , s

 
 2
hs
Z s
0
ad +as

+ Ua
 
s; Y s; as

as ;
 2s , s
Z s
t

 
 2
h
Z 
0
ardr +a

dZa

+ Iat (s)

 
 2
hs
Z s
0
ad +as

:
Given that  2s is square integrable,
31 we have
Eat
Z T
t
 2sdZ
a
s

= 0 :
As for the deterministic term, collecting the e¤ect of each perturbation as yields
e trV a(t) = Eat
Z T
t

 
Z T
s


 2
h

d + s + Ua
 
s; Y s; as

asds

:
Finally, noticing that as was arbitrary leads to
Eat

 
Z T
t
s
 2
hs
ds

+ t + Ua
 
t; Y t; a

t

(at   at )  0 : (44)
Step 3: We now rewrite our solution as a function of the promised value vt.
Di¤erentiating (42) with respect to time yields
e tdvt   e tvt + U
 
t; Y t; at

= dIa(t) = tdZ
a
t ;
so that
dvt =
 
vt   U
 
Y t; at

dt+ tdZ
a
t ;
31Square integrability of  2s can be established for any " 2 [0; "0) following the same steps as in
Lemma 7.3 of Cvitani´c et al. (2009).
35
with t , tet. Collecting the exponential terms in (44) leads to (11).
Proof. Proposition 2: The su¢ cient conditions are established comparing the
equilibrium path fatgTt=0 with an arbitrary e¤ort path fatgTt=0. We dene t , at at
and t ,
R t
0
sds = At   At as the di¤erences in current and cumulative e¤ort
between the arbitrary and recommended paths. We also attach a star superscript to
denote the value of the FY measurable stochastic processes along the equilibrium
path. The Brownian motions generated by the two e¤ort policies are related by
dZa

t = dZ
a
t + [^ (Yt   At; t) + at   ^ (Yt   At ; t)  at ] dt
= dZat +

t   
 2
ht
t

dt :
By denition, the total reward from the optimal policy reads
Ia

(T ) =
Z T
0
U
 
t; Y t; a

t

dt+W
 
Y T

= V a

(0) +
Z T
0
tdZ
a
t
= V a

(0) +
Z T
0
t

t   
 2
ht
t

dt+
Z T
0
tdZ
a
t :
Hence, the total reward from the arbitrary policy is given by
Ia (T ) =
Z T
0

U
 
t; Y t; at
  U  t; Y t; at  dt+ Ia (T )
=
Z T
0

U
 
t; Y t; at
  U  t; Y t; at  dt+ V a (0)
+
Z T
0
t

t   
 2
ht
t

dt+
Z T
0
tdZ
a
t :
Let us focus on the third term on the right hand side
 
Z T
0
t
 2
ht
tdt =  
Z T
0
t
 2
ht
Z t
0
sds

dt =
Z T
0
t

 
Z T
t
s
 2
hs
ds

dt
=
Z T
0
t

e t
 2
ht
pt +
Z T
t
sdZ
a
s

dt ;
where the last equality follows from the denition of p and .32 Changing the Brown-
32Observe that this additional step is linked to the introduction of private information. Then the
volatility  of the continuation value will di¤er on and o¤ the equilibrium path. To the contrary, in
problems without private information, the volatility remains constant because it only depends on
observable output and not on past actions. This is why su¢ ciency holds without restriction in, e.g.,
Schättler and Sung (1993) or Sannikov (2008).
36
ian motion and taking expectation yields
V a (0)  V a (0) = Ea0 [Ia (T )]  V a

(0)
= Ea0
Z T
0

U
 
t; Y t; at
  U  t; Y t; at + tt + e t 2ht pt

dt

+Ea0
Z T
0
Z T
t
s

s   
 2
hs
s

ds

dt

= Ea0
Z T
0
e t

U (wt; at)  U (wt; at ) + t

t +
 2
ht
pt

dt

+Ea0
Z T
0
ettt

t   
 2
ht
t

dt

:
We know from the optimization property of at that the rst expectation term is at
most equal to zero. On the other hand, the sign of the second expectation term
is ambiguous. In order to bound it, we introduce the predictable process33 t ,
t   ettAt and dene the Hamiltonian function
H (t; a; A;; ; p) , U (w; a) +
 
 + etA

a  et
 2
ht
A2 +
 2
ht
pa :
Taking a linear approximation of the Hamiltonian around A yields
Ht (at; At) Ht (at ; At ) 
@Ht (a

t ; A

t )
@A
t
= U (wt; at)  U (wt; at ) + t
0B@t + ettAt| {z }
=t
+
 2
ht
pt
1CA+ etttt    2ht t

;
so that
V a (0)  V a (0) = Ea0
Z T
0
e t

Ht (at; At) Ht (at ; At ) 
@Ht (a

t ; A

t )
@A
t

dt

is negative when the Hamiltonian function is jointly concave. Given that the agent
seeks to maximize expected returns, imposing concavity ensures that a dominates
any alternative e¤ort path. Concavity is established considering the Hessian matrix
of the Hamiltonian
H (t; a; A) =

Uaa (wt; at) e
tt
ett  2ett  2ht

;
which is negative semi-denite when  2 2
ht
Uaa (wt; at)  ett, as stated in (16).
33 is predictable since both  and A are FY predictable.
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Proof. Corollary 1: Let bt be dened as
bt , E

 
Z T
0
e ss

h"
hs

ds
Fat  = b0 + Z t
0
sdZs; for all t 2 [0; T ] ;
where the second equality follows from (17). Then the denition of pt in (15) implies
that
pt = e
t2ht

bt +
Z t
0
e ss
 2
hs
ds

;
and so, as T goes to innity, pt solves the SDE34
dpt =

pt +
d (2ht)
dt
 2
ht
pt + t

dt+et2htdbt =

pt

+
 2
ht

+ t

dt+#tdZt ;
with #t , et2htt.
Proof. Proposition 3: Assume that
j (v; t) =

e t


[j0 (t) + j1 ln ( v)] ;
w(t; v) =   ln(ktv)

+ ) U(w; 1) =  ktv :
Observe rst that our guess implies that
t (v; w; a) =  Ua (w (t; v) ; 1) 
 2
ht
v =  U (w (t; v) ; 1) 
 2
ht
v = v

kt   
 2
ht

:
Hence, di¤erentiating the Incentive Constraint yields
@t (v; w; a)
@w
=  Uaw (w; a) =  t (v; w; a) 
 2
ht
2vt :
Therefore, the FOC for wages is equivalent to
 e t   @j
@v
vkt   2 @
2j
@v2
"
v

kt   
 2
ht
2
+ (v)2

kt   
 2
ht

 2
ht
#

=

e t

 
   j1kt + 2j1
"
kt   
 2
ht
2
+

kt   
 2
ht

 2
ht
#
23
!
=

e t


   j1kt + 2j1

kt

kt   
 2
ht

23

= 0 ;
34The change with respect to time of  2=ht is given by
d
 
 2=ht

dt
=
d

 2
 
h0 + t
 2 1
dt
=   4  h0 + t 2 2 =   2
ht
2
< 0 :
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implying the following quadratic equation for kt
   kt

j1 + 
2j1
 2
ht
23

+ k2t
 
2j1
23

= 0 : (45)
The remaining step consists in checking that the HJB equation is indeed satised
e t (1  w) + @j
@t
+
@j
@v
(v   U (w; 1)) +

2
2

@2j
@v2
2
= e t
24

1 + ln( v)

+ ln( kt)

  

  [j0 (t) + j1 ln ( v)] +

1


j00 (t)
+

1


j1 (+ kt) 

2
2

1


j1



kt    2ht
2
35 = 0 ;
when j1 = 
 1 and
j00 (t)  j0 (t) =  

1  + ln( kt)


  + kt

+
 ()2
2

kt   
 2
ht
2
: (46)
The quadratic equation (24) is obtained reinserting j1 in (45)
   kt
 
1 +
()2
ht
!
+ k2t ()
2 = 0 :
The relevant solution is unique and given by the negative root because wages are not
well dened when kt > 0. The ODE described in the Proposition is obtained noticing
that the quadratic equation above implies that
()2
2

kt   
 2
ht
2
= + kt +
()2
2
 
 2
ht
2
  k2t
!
;
and reinserting this expression into (46).
As usual, the unique solution to the ODE is pinned down by its boundary con-
dition. The value function as t ! 1 must converge to the solution of the problem
without parameter uncertainty, i.e., when ht is innite. It can be derived solving the
following HJB
0 = max
fa;wg

e t (a  w) + @l
@t
+
@l
@v
(v   U (w; a)) +

2
2

@2l
@v2
 (v; w; a)2

;
with
 (v; w; a)   Ua (a; w) ; for all a > 0 :
The solution is of the form l (t; v) = e t
h
l0 +
ln( v)

i
with
l0 = 

1  + ln( k1)


+
 ()2
2
k21 ;
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where k1 = limt!1 k (t) =

1
2()2
  
1 p1 + 4. One can easily verify that the
desired convergence of j0 (t) to l0 as t!1 holds true when the boundary condition
limt!1 j00 (t) = 0 is satised.
Proof. Corollary 2: Given that #t = 

t (v) = ()
2 v

kt    2ht

and
Uaa (wt; a

t ) = ()
2 ( ktv) ; the su¢ cient condition of Proposition 2 are satised
when
2ktv   v

kt   
 2
ht

= v

kt +
 2
ht

> 0,  kt > 
 2
ht
: (47)
The explicit solution of the quadratic equation for kt reads
2kt =
1
()2
+
 2
ht
 
s
1
()2
+
 2
ht
2
+
4
()2
; (48)
and so
dk (t)
dt
=

1
2
26641  1()2 + 
 2
htr
1
()2
+ 
 2
ht
2
+ 4
()2
3775 d
 
 2h 1t

dt| {z }
<0
< 0 : (49)
Since  2=ht is decreasing in t, condition (47) is satised for all t provided that
 k0 >  2=h0, i.e.
  1
()2
  3

 2
h0

+
s
1
()2
+

 2
h0
2
+
4
()2
> 0 ;
which, after some straightforward simplications, leads to the requirement (27).
Proof. Corollary 3: The statement immediately follows from
1
2
>
dk( 2=ht)
d ( 2=ht)
=

1
2
26641  1()2 + 
 2
htr
1
()2
+ 
 2
ht
2
+ 4
()2
3775 > 0 ;
and the solution for wages wt (v) =   ln(ktv)= +  :
Proof. Corollary 4: Reinserting the law of motion (28) for v into (29) and
applying Itos lemma yields35
dwt =  

1

" 
1
kt

dkt
dt
+ + kt   ()
2
2

kt   
 2
ht
2!
dt+ 

kt   
 2
ht

dZt
#
=  

1

" 
1
kt

dkt
dt
  ()
2
2
 
 2
ht
2
  k2t
!!
dt+ 

kt   
 2
ht

dZt
#
:
35See the proof of Proposition 4 for the intermediate step linking the two equalities.
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The statement for the volatility component is established reinserting dk( 2=ht)=d ( 2=ht)
into
 
d

k(t)   2
h(t)

dt
=  

dk(t)
dt
  d (
 2=h (t))
dt

=  
0BBB@dk( 2=h (t))d ( 2=h (t))| {z }
2(0;1=2)
  1
1CCCA d ( 2=h (t))dt| {z }
<0
< 0 :
The sign of the deterministic trend is established remembering that the su¢ cient
condition (16) holds if and only if  kt >  2=ht: Hence, ( 2=ht)2   k2t < 0, and so
the trend is negative.
Proof. Corollary 5: Let 	(t) denote the following function
	(t) , 

(1  ) + ln( kt)


  ()
2 
2
 
s2   k2t

;
so that
j00 (t)  j0 (t) + 	 (t) = 0 :
Di¤erentiating 	(t) with respect to time yields36
	0 (t) = 

1
kt

dk(t)
dt
  ()
2 
2

 
 2
ht
  ktdk(t)
dt

> 0 :
Hence, if j0 (t)  	(t), we have j00 (t) < 0 and so j0 () < 	() for all   t.
But this contradicts the boundary condition limt!1 j0 (t) = 	 (t). We can therefore
conclude that j0 (t) > 	(t) which implies in turn that j00 (t) > 0. Given that
parameter precision is increasing in time, the claim stated in Corollary 5 follows.
Proof. Proposition 4: The proof proceeds one part at a time:
Part (i) : This claim holds because the utility function has no wealth e¤ect on the
demand for leisure, and results formally because ^s (s  t) drops out of the FOC
determining at. Parts (ii)(C) and (iii)(A). We construct a solution to the rst-
order condition in the way that implies the claims. If the claims (i) and (ii) are
correct, since @Ys=@at = 1 for s  t, the rst-order condition for optimal e¤ort at
date t is
@U
@a
(^ (Yt At; t) ; at)+
Z 1
t
e (s t)
@
@Y
Et [U (^ (Ys As; s) ; as)] ds
8<:
> 0 if ht< h1
= 0 if ht2 [h1; h2]
< 0 if ht> h2
:
(50)
36Remember that both dk(t)=dt and k(t) are negative.
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Now let T be such that hT = h2. Then, as = 0 for s  T and As = AT , implying
that at t = T (50) becomes
 @U (^ (YT   AT ; T ) ; 0)
@a
=
Z 1
T
e (s T )
@
@Y
ET [U (^ (Ys   AT ; s) ; 0)] ds : (51)
It is shown in the nal partof the proof below that (51) is equivalent to
 =
Z 1
0
e 
"
1
2
hT + 
1
2
exp
 
2
2
 1
2
hT + 
1
2
2  
2 + h 1T
!#
| {z }
=g( ;T )
d ; (52)
which does not depend on the posterior ^T . This implies that the stopping time T
does not vary with cumulative output YT . Since that g( ;T ) is strictly decreasing
in T , the equality can be satised only for at most a single T . The RHS of (52)
is continuous in T , and limT!1 g( ;T ) = 0. Therefore a solution for T exists if
 <
R
g ( ; T ) d , i.e., if (33) holds. This proves (iii)(A):and (ii)(C).
Part (ii)(B). Since at is continuous in t, there exists a  > 0 such that optimal e¤ort
is interior, i.e. at 2 (0; 1) for all t 2 (T   ; T ) : Similar steps as before (and also
reported below in the nal partof the proof) yield
f(t) =
Z 1
0
e f(t+ )
"
1
2
ht + 
1
2
exp
 
2
2
 1
2
ht + 
1
2
2  
2 + h 1t
!#
| {z }
=g( ;t)
d ; (53)
where f (t) = exp (at). Di¤erentiating (53) yields
f0(t) =
Z 1
0
e 

f 0(t+ )g( ; t) + f(t+ )
@g( ; t)
@t

d :
Given that @g( ; t)=@t < 0 and that both f () and g () are nonnegative, if (a) (53)
holds as an exact equality and if (b) f (t) > 0, then
f 0 (t+ )  0 for  > 0 =) f 0 (t) < 0 :
That is, a su¢ cient condition for the derivative at time t to be negative is that it is
at most zero afterwards. This is easily established considering the limit as t goes to
T . First, we know that f 0(T + ) = 0 for all  > 0. Furthermore, since T is unique,
f (t) > 0 for t 2 (T   ; T ). Iterating this argument we conclude that at must be
decreasing
at 2 (0; 1) =) f0(t) = exp (at) _at < 0 :
Part (iii)(C). If h0 is small enough so that h0 < h1, we shall end up at the upper
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bound. Since
@2
@Yt@at
E0 [U (^ (Yt   At; t) ; at)] = 2
 2
h
U < 0 ;
a su¢ cient condition for an initial horizontal segment in Figure 5 to exist is that (34)
should hold.
Final part of the proof. It remains for us to show that (51) implies (52) and (53).
Derivation of (52). First we show that (51) implies
 exp ( ^ (YT   AT ; T )) =
Z 1
T
e (s t)
 2
hs
ET [U (^ (Ys   AT ; s) ; 0)] ds : (54)
Observe that
@
@Y
Et [U (^ (Ys As; s) ; as)] = Et [U (^ (Ys As+; s) ; as)]

 
 2
hs

:
Hence, since
^ (Ys   As; s) =
h0m0 +
1
2
(Ys   As)
ht
ht
hs
+
Ys t   As t
2hs
= ^ (Yt   At; t) + 
 2
hs
(Ys t   As t   ^ (Yt   At; t) (s  t)) ;
we have for any s  t
Et [U (^ (Ys   As; s) ; as)]
= exp ( ^ (Yt At; t))Et

  exp

 

 2
hs
[Ys t As t ^ (Yt  At; t) (s  t)] as

z :
Reinserting this expression into the RHS of (54) and rearranging yields
 =
Z 1
T
e (s t)
 2
hs
ET

exp

 

 2
hs
[Ys T   ^ (YT   AT ; T ) (s  T )]

ds :
The expectation is derived noticing that the distribution of Ys T =
R s
T
dY can be
expressed as
'Y (Ys T j^T ) =
Z
'Y (Ys T jT )'(T )d = N
 
(s  T ) ^T ; (s  T )2 + h 1T

because 'Y (Ys T jT ) = N ((s  T ) T ; (s  T )2) and '(T ) = N
 
^T ; h
 1
T

. Hence
the expectation is taken over a lognormally distributed variable so that
ET

exp

 

 2
hs
[Ys T   ^T (s  T )]

= exp
 
2
2

 2
hs
2 
(s  T )2 + h 1T
!
:
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The optimality condition is therefore given by (52).
Derivation of (53). We have
 @U (^ (Yt   At; t) ; at)
@a
=
Z 1
t
e (s t)
@
@Y
Et [U (^ (Ys   As; s) ; as)] ds, i.e.,
 exp (at) =
Z 1
t
e (s t)
 2
hs
exp (as) exp
 
2
2

 2
hs
2 
(s  t)2+h 1t
!
ds ;
which, upon a change of variable to  = s  t can be rewritten as (53).
Appendix B: Additional results
Derivation of (15): We rst change variable and dene ~pt , ( 2=ht) pt. Then
~pt =  E
R T
t
e (s t)s
 2
hs
ds; so that di¤erentiating with respect to time leads to
d~pt
dt
= ~pt +
 2
ht
t = ~pt  
 2
ht
(Ua (wt; at) + ~pt) ;
where the second equality follows after substitution of t =  Ua (wt; a)   ~pt: Inte-
grating this expression, we obtain
~pt = Ea
Z T
t
e (s t)+
R s
t
 2
h
d 
 2
hs
Ua (ws; as) ds

:
To simplify the integral in the exponent, we observe that
 2
h
=
 2
h0 +  2
=
d lnht
d
=) exp
Z s
t
 2
h
d

= exp (lnhs   lnht) = hs
ht
:
Therefore
~pt = Ea
Z T
t
e (s t)

hs
ht

 2
hs

Ua (ws; as) ds

=
 2
ht
Ea
Z T
t
e (s t)Ua (ws; as) ds

;
which, given the denition of ~pt, is equivalent to (15). Observe, however, that when
at = 0 for some t then (13) is not representable as (15).
Extending the HJB eq.(19) to include ^: The HJB equations dened in (19)
and (21) can be extended to include ^ and would still be satised. To see this, dene
Xt , Yt At and g (Xt; t) , e t^(Xt; t)=. This function satises the HJB equations
below because
e t^(Xt; t)+
@g
@t
+^X(Xt; t)
@g
@Xt
+
2t
2
@2g
@X2t
= e t
"
^(Xt; t)  ^(Xt; t)
+1 ^t(Xt; t)+
1
 ^Xt(Xt; t)^(Xt; t)
#
=

e t


^t(Xt; t) + ^Xt(Xt; t)^(Xt; t)

= 0 ;
where the last equality follows from (7).
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Appendix C: Details of the piece-rate simulation in Figure 8
As explained in the text, we simulate the piece rate model using a discrete-time
solution. We consider agents with a nite lifetime horizon T and establish the prop-
erties of interest when T goes to innity.
Last Period. The Zero Prot Condition (ZPC hereafter) on the RHS of (36)
holds when
b0;T = (1  b1;T )E

yT j yT

= (1  b1;T ) (^T + aT ) ;
where yT , fy0; y1; :::; yT 1g denote the output history at the beginning of period
T . For the utility function in (20), the agents utility is maximized when he provides
full e¤ort aT = 1, which is incentive compatible i¤ b1;T  . Minimizing the income
variance yields
b0;T = (1  ) (^T + 1) ;
b1;T =  :
Previous Periods.
Claim 1 The sequence fb1;tgTt=1 is deterministic. Hence, output history and cross-
agent di¤erences in beliefs ^t a¤ect only the mean, not the variance of wages
Proof. The proof is established recursively. From the discussion above, we know
that b1;T = , independently of the output history. We now establish that if fb1;sgTs=t+1
is deterministic, so is b1;t. By the denition of preferences and by the ZPC
U (ws; as) = exp (  [(1  b1;s) (^s + as) + b1;sys   as]) ;
where recommended as and actual as e¤orts are allowed to di¤er. Given that ys is
independent of at for all s > t, we have37
@U (ws; as)
@at
=  

@^s
@at

(1  b1;s)U (ws; as) + 

@b1;s
@at

"sU (ws; as) :
The second term on the RHS is equal to zero under the premise that fb1;sgTs=t+1 is
deterministic. Then after dividing by , the agents FOC reads
(b1   )Et 1 [Ut] +
TX
s=t+1
s t
h"
hs
(1  b1;s)Et 1 [Us] = 0 : (55)
37Remember that we dene output yt in period as
yt = at +  + "t :
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Observe that the premise is again required in order to take (1  b1;s) out of the
expectation term. Because the optimal contract minimizes the variance of income,
the agents FOC also denes the optimal indexation to performance b1;t. Rearranging
yields the simplied optimality condition
b1;t = max (0;  Rt) ; (56)
which, after a certain date, will always admit an interior solution where
Rt =
TX
s=t+1
s t
h"
hs
(1  b1;s) Et 1 [Us]
Et 1 [Ut]
(57)
is the reputational concern. The ZPC implies that in every period
b0;t = (1  b1;t) (^t + at ) ;
and so utilities along the equilibrium path are equal to
U (ws; as) = exp (  [^t + b1;t"t + at (1  )]) :
According to our parametric assumption, conditional on beginning-of-date-t informa-
tion,
  [^s + b1;s"s]  N
  ^t; 2  h 1t   h 1s + b21;s2" :
Furthermore, we know that full e¤ort is sustainable at time T . Since incentives are
more easily provided in previous periods due to reputational concerns, full e¤ort is
implementable at all t  T , and will be recommended because the higher the action,
the better o¤ the agent is. Hence, we can set at = 1 for all t  T , implying that
Et 1 [Us] =   exp

 ^t +
2
2
 
h 1t   h 1s + b21;s2"

exp (1  ) ;
and, since
Et 1 [Ut] =   exp

 ^t +
2
2
b21;t
2
"

exp (1  ) ;
we have
Et 1 [Us]
Et 1 [Ut]
= exp

2
2
 
h 1t   h 1s +

b21;s   b21;t

2"

:
Substituting into (57) we nally obtain
Rt =
TX
s=t+1
s t
h"
hs
(1  b1;s) exp

2
2
 
h 1t   h 1s +

b21;s   b21;t

2"

; (58)
which is independent of output history. Given that b1;t = 1 Rt, the claim is proved.
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Figure 10: A plot of b1;t for three separate horizons
Mean wages and the standard-deviation band. Since equilibrium e¤ort at = 1,
mean wages are unity when ^t = 0: As Cherno¤ (1968) shows, the variance of ^t is
h 10   h 1t . The piece-rate variance is b1;t. Therefore the one-Standard Deviation
band reads q
h 10   h 1t + 2b21;t (59)
For Holmströms model, the one-Standard Deviation band is narrower and equal toq
h 10   h 1t (60)
Comparison to full commitment. Figure 8 compares the above to a continuous-
time formulation with (; ) given. Taking period length , the discrete-time piece-
rate model chooses the discount factor
2" = 
2 and  =
1
1 + 
and solve the discrete case for  = 1. A simulation is done in Figure 10, with
three horizons separately, T = 300; 600 and 900; respectively. As we had asserted
when discussing the results, the simulations show that b1;t converges rather slowly to
its limit of  = 0:5. Furthermore, the simulated values in the early periods hardly
depend on the horizon length thereby justifying our approximation of the innite
horizon problem.
47
